



One of the enduring tensions in law enforcement is between the
need to keep public areas clear of annoying, unnerving, and poten-
tially dangerous people and the right to gather, converse, and idle.
Attempts to resolve this tension have often taken the form of "street
sweeping" statutes-loitering and vagrancy laws that prohibit certain
behavior that falls short of traditional criminal conduct. Although
these statutes were and are common, attempts to enforce them occa-
sionally founder, as courts are prone to find the most extreme of
these laws unconstitutionally vague.'
Recently the City of Chicago thought it had struck a proper bal-
ance between being specific about the prohibited behavior while still
giving the police enough discretion to handle the problem. In 1992
it passed an ordinance prohibiting "criminal street gang members"
from "loitering" (defined as "remain[ing] in any one place for no
apparent purpose") in public with each other or with non-gang
members. If a police officer observed gang members loitering, she
had the authority to order the group to disperse and the individuals
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See, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 359-61 (1983) (holding unconstitutionally
vague a California statute requiring loiterers to present "credible and reliable" identification, as
it provided inadequate notice to potential suspects and gave police officers too much discre-
tion); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (holding a Jacksonville va-
grancy ordinance unconstitutionally vague, as it was too general and inclusive, providing little
notice to potential offenders); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614-15 (1971) (hold-
ing that a Cincinnati ordinance making it an offense to assemble in a group of three or more
people and act in a manner annoying to passers-by was unconstitutional for vagueness and for
infringing on the right to assemble); see also Broughton v. Brewer, 298 F. Supp. 260, 271 (S.D.
Ala. 1969) (holding that an Alabama vagrancy statute that listed thirteen broad definitions for
the term "vagrancy" was unconstitutionally overbroad and gave inadequate notice to potential
offenders); E.L. v. State, 619 So. 2d 252, 253 (Fla. 1993) (holding unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad a Sanford ordinance prohibiting loitering for the purpose of engaging in drg-
related activity); People v. Bright, 520 N.E.2d 1355, 1361 (N.Y. 1988) (holding that a New York
statute prohibiting a person from loitering in a transportation facility was unconstitutionally
vague, as it failed to give adequate notice to potential offenders and afforded police officers too
much discretion).
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to remove themselves from the area." Failure to follow the officer's
command was an arrestable offense, for which the offender could be
fined, imprisoned for up to six months, and required to perform
community service.3 In an effort to further narrow the ordinance's
reach, the police department developed guidelines to limit officers'
enforcement discretion. Under the guidelines, only police officers
who specialized in gang activity could order the dispersal, and criteria
were developed to help define what was meant by a "criminal street
gang."4 The ordinance also was to be enforced only in certain areas,
where the presence of gangs had a demonstrated effect on the quality
of the neighborhood.
5
Chicago hoped that its ordinance would survive a constitutional
test where others had failed because of two features. Among the
problems with earlier loitering statutes was that the prohibited con-
duct was defined so broadly that the law could in theory be applied
against virtually anyone who appeared in public. In addition, the po-
lice were free to arrest without warning, and that %-as simply too
much discretion for courts to tolerate? The Chicago ordinance, in
contrast, focused on a subset of pedestrians--gang members-and
required that anyone punished by the statute first engage in objec-
tively identifiable conduct: refusal to comply with a dispersal order.
Surely, the City argued when challenged in court, there was no unfair
surprise to people in this situation, because the police would give ac-
tual notice and a chance to comply before the law was violated.
The gamble failed, of course, as the Supreme Court in City of Chi-
2 The text of the ordinance provided in part
Whenever a police officer observes a person whom he reasonably believes to be a crimi-
nal street gang member loitering in any public place %ith one or more other persons, he
shall order all such persons to disperse and remove themselves from the area. Any per-
son who does not promptly obey such an order is in violation of this section.
The remaining text and background of the ordinance are set forth in City of Chicago v. Mora-
les, 687 N.E.2d 53, 57-58 (III. 1997), afFd, 527 U.S. 41 (1999).
sIdat 58.
4 The ordinance defined a "criminal street gang" as:
any ongoing organization, association in fact or group of three or more persons, whether
formal or informal, having as one of its substantial activities the commission of one or
more of the criminal acts enumerated in [other parts of the ordinance], and whose
members individually or collectively engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal
gang activity.
Id. The Chicago Police Department then promulgated a -General Order," which "set[I forth
standards for identifying criminal street gangs and specified criteria for establishing probable
cause that an individual is a member of a criminal street gang." Id. at 59.
5 For a description of the Chicago Police Department's General Order 92-4, see Brief for
Petitioner at 5-6, City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) (No. 97-1121).
Perhaps the ciearest example of this problem is found in Coates t. Cit of Ciannnats. There
Cincinnati passed an ordinance that said: "[i]t shall be unlawful for three or more persons to
assemble, except at a public meeting of citizens, on any of the sidewal's, street corners. acant
lots, or mouths of alleys, and there conduct themselves in a manner anno)ing to persons pass-
ing by, or occupants of adjacent buildings." Coates, 402 U.S. at 611 n.l. Under this statute there
was no opportunity for those subject to the law to bring themselves into compliance.
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cago v. Morales7 invalidated the ordinance on vagueness grounds. This
decision was widely praised by civil libertarians, who had argued that
loitering statutes like this give too much power to the police to decide
who is breaking the law, discretion that inevitably would be exercised
more often against the poor and minority-race citizens. Given the
impressive amount of data now available supporting the assertion that
street-level contact between police and citizens does have a racially-
disparate effect,8 these fears, and the resulting sense of relief follow-
ing Morales, were understandable.
But as Tracey Meares, Dan Kahan, and others have argued, cases
like Morales are not an unqualified benefit to minority-race citizens;"
indeed, they may not be a benefit at all. Pushing against the compel-
ling need to prevent intrusive police practices is the need to protect
law-abiding citizens from the intimidating public behavior of gang
members and other (overwhelmingly) young men. Because so much
of the housing in this country is segregated, one impact of a greater
freedom to loiter is a diminished ability of other members of the
same racial and ethnic groups to enjoy public areas. Morales may in
general be a "meaningful victory for young men of color,"' but for
other people of color who must walk past aggressive loiterers on the
street, the victory may seem pyrrhic.
Not surprisingly, Chicago rewrote its gang loitering ordinance in
February 2000 in an effort to cure the vagueness identified by the
Court," which means that more litigation is on the horizon.' 2 The re-
vised ordinance tries to limit police discretion even further by making
the standard more objective: a gang member now is loitering if he
"remain [s] in any one place under circumstances that would warrant
a reasonable person to believe that the purpose or effect of that behavior is
to enable a criminal street gang to establish control over identifiable
areas, to intimidate others from entering those areas, or to conceal
527 U.S. 41 (1999).
8 See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW YORK STATE, REPORT ON THE NEW
YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT'S "STOP & FRISK" PRACTICES 92-135 (1999), available at http://
www.oag.state.ny.us/press/reports/stop_ frisk/stopfrisk.html.
9 See Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, The Wages Of Antiquated Procedural Thinking A Cn-
tique of Chicago v. Morales, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 197, 211-14 (criticizing Illinois Supreme
Court decision for striking down anti-loitering statute as not in the best interest of defendants
or society); see also Brief of Amici Curiae Chicago Neighborhood Organizations, City of Chicago
v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) (No. 97-1121) (briefjoined by Professors Meares and Kahan).
10 See ACLU and the Public Defender Hail U.S. Supreme Court Decision Holding Chicago's 'Anti-Gang
Loitering'Law Unconstitutioal PR NEWSWIRE,June 10, 1999, LEXIS, News Library, PR Newswire
File.
1 See CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 8-4-015 to -017 (2000) (added Feb. 16, 2000).
1 At the time of passage, the American Civil Liberties Union promised to challenge the new
ordinance in court. See Gary Washburn, City OKs Gang Law, Expects Challenge, CHI. TRIB., Feb.
17, 2000, § 2, at 1. As of August 2000, the police had issued thirty-nine dispersal orders and
made four arrests under the new ordinance. The ACLU still said that it opposed the new law
but had not yet taken legal action. See Pam Belluck, Chicago Mlakes Another Effort to Disrupt Gangs,
CHI. TRIB., Aug. 30, 2000, § 1, at 22.
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illegal activities."' s
Perhaps the revised ordinance will survive a vagueness challenge;
the revisions track a suggestion by Justice O'Connor in her concur-
ring opinion in Morales on ways to sharpen the ordinance."' But even
if the new ordinance survives legally, it is far from clear whether it will
significantly reduce the problem of excessive discretion. After Mora-
les, it also is uncertain how much more focused these statutes can be
made while remaining adequate to the task. The hope of this essay is
to recast the problem and to suggest a modified approach.
I. THE BACKDROP
A. Thw Problem
The problem of loitering is as old as the Republic, although its
contours have changed over the years.'5 The poor asking for money
and the homeless seeking a place to sleep have alwa,.yS troubled resi-
dents, particularly those living in the close quarters of a city.'" Chari-
table and civil law efforts ease some of the problems, but for the ag-
gressively idle or the overtly unpleasant, the usual response has been
the criminal law. 7 Although loitering and vagrancy statutes typically
specify at least some prohibited acts, usually the conduct is not itself
harmful. Instead, the prohibited conduct is often described in a way
that correlates to the behavior of the poor and the dispossessed, mak-
ing much of their public behavior subject to police oversight."'
is §§ 8-4-015(a), (d) (1) (emphasis added). The revised ordinance also attempts to resole
an unsettled claim of vagueness over the meaning of "dispersal." Some of those challenging the
original ordinance claimed that the police officer's power to order gang members to "dispcrse
and remove themselves from the area" was excessively vague (How far must a person remove
himself from the area? How long must lie stay away?). The revised ordinance provides that
those subject to a dispersal order must not "engage in further gang loitering within sight or
hearing of the place at which the order was issued during tie next three hours.' Id. at (a) (iiil.
14 See Morales, 527 U.S. at 66 (O'ConnorJ., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment) ("If the ordinance applied only to persons reasonably believed to be gang members, this
requirement might have cured the ordinance's vagueness because it would Ihave directed tile
manner in which the order was issued by specif)ing to whom tie order could bc issued.'. Jus.
lice O'Connor's views on vagueness are critical here: site wasjoined in her opinion byJustice
Breyer, and there were three dissenters who would have upheld the ordinance as originall)
drafted.
15 Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Cronic Misconduc in Citi Spaces: Of'Panhandlm, Skid Riai,
and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE LJ. 1165, 1210 (1996) (:English vagrancv statutes. nimull
enacted in the fourteenth century to control wages and prevent idleness, had evolved bs the
time of the American Revolution into a hodge-podge of controls on minor public offenscs, in-
cluding begging and sleeping in the open.").
16 For "a brief history of street disorder and skid rows,' see id. at 1202-19.
17 For an insightful discussion of this subject, see Debra Uvingston. Police Dumteean and the
Quality of Life in Public Places: Court, Communities, and the ut Policing, 97 COLt %1. L REV. 551
(1997). See also Ellickson, supra note 15, at 1170.
is In case there was any doubt in the minds of the police that loitering statutes were to be
enforced primarily against the poor, the drafters of some statutes were explicit. Consider tile
loitering ordinance in Papadiristou v. City of Jadsonville, 405 U.S. 156, 158 n.l (1972). hich
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Ordinances like those in Morales have a much more focused target
in mind: young males who are most likely to associate with gangs,
whether as members or otherwise. Singling out this group is both
predictable and rational, since its members commit a disproportion-
ate amount of crime in general, and the street-level crimes of theft,
drug possession and sale, assault, and robbery in particular.' 9 It also
comes as no surprise, however, that these young men are overwhelm-
ingly poor and disproportionately members of racial and ethnic mi-
norities. Poor education, the resulting lack of realistic career paths,
ongoing effects of bias, and lack of parental and other role models
mean that too many angry young men have too much time on their
hands and too many friends who share their situation. The conse-
quence is too often a group of "brazen, disorderly and visibly lawless
persons on the public ways [who] intimidate[] residents, detract[]
from property values, and ultimately destabilize [] communities.
20
In most contexts the generalized threat of future criminality is not
a basis for intervention; the police must either wait until a crime is at-
made outlaws of certain members of the poor ("persons who go about begging") and the un-
employed ("persons able to work but habitually living upon the earnings of their wives or minor
children"). When it came time to describe the actual conduct that was bothersome, however,
more care was required. Thus, not all gamblers, drunkards, street walkers, or those who fre-
quented houses of ill fame were targeted: only "common" gamblers, "common" drunkards, and
those who frequented prostitutes while "neglecting all lawful business" were subject to arrest.
Id. at 156-58 & n.1 (setting forth text of ordinance).
Although the Jacksonville ordinance was invalidated, its terms are not unique. See, e.g., 11
DEL CODEANN. tit. 11, § 132(6) (1974) (making it a violation for a person to "loiter[], congre-
gate[] with others or prowl[] in a place at a time or in a manner not usual for law-abiding indi-
viduals under circumstances that warrant alarm for the safety of persons or property in the vi-
cinity, especially in light of the crime rate in the relevant area;" if practicable, peace officer
must "afford the accused an opportunity to dispel any alarm which would otherwise be war-
ranted" before making an arrest).
19 Men make up nearly 80% of those arrested for all crimes, and over 75% of all street-level
crime except larceny (65%) and prostitution/commercialized vice (40%). See BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINALJUSTICE STATISTICS 1998
340 tbl.4.8 (1999) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK 1998]. Roughly 45% of those arrested are under
age 25. Id. at 339 tbl.4.7.
See Brief for Petitioner at 9-10, City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) (No. 97-
1121). Recently the California Supreme Court recounted the vivid declarations made by the
City of San Jose in its efforts to obtain an injunction against street gangs. The City described
the problems in one of its neighborhoods:
Gang members, all of whom live elsewhere, congregate on lawns, on sidewalks, and in
front of apartment complexes at all hours of the day and night. They display a casual
contempt for notions of law, order, and decency-openly drinking, smoking dope, sniff-
ing toluene, and even snorting cocaine laid out in neat lines on the hoods of residents'
cars. The people who live in Rocksprings are subjected to loud talk, loud music, vulgar-
ity, profanity, brutality, fistfights and the sound of gunfire echoing in the streets. Gang
members take over sidewalks, driveways, carports, apartment parking areas, and impede
traffic on the public thoroughfares to conduct their drive-up drug bazaar .... Area resi-
dents have had their garages used as urinals; their homes commandeered as escape
routes; their walls, fences, garage doors, sidewalks, and even their vehicles turned into a
sullen canvas of gang graffiti .... The people of this community are prisoners in their
own homes.
People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 601 (Cal.), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1121 (1997).
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tempted or engage in costly monitoring or undercover work to inter-
vene to prevent the crimes. Much of the crime engaged in by gang
members, however, stubbornly defies these efforts. The opportunis-
tic loiterer who is selling drugs, committing small thefts, spray-
painting graffiti, or intimidating pedestrians is often in no hurry. He
can wait until the police pass by and wrait for another customer or an-
other victim, making monitoring extremely expensive. "' Undercover
work is also difficult, in part because infiltration of groups is risky and
in part because some of the crimes involve little advanced planning.
Finally, waiting for the crimes to occur and then investigating is a
frustrating and often fruitless enterprise. Vrictims are reluctant to tes-
tify against gang members for all of the obvious reasonsO' More im-
portantly, residents will often simply change their behavior-they will
not walk in those city blocks, will not go out after dark, or in extreme
cases, will move out of the neighborhood entirely.s
Given these difficulties, the power to disperse a troublesome
group as contemplated by the Chicago ordinance is often the best
option for addressing the residents' quality of life concerns. As an
abstract matter, this is a workable, even desirable system. All have the
right to enjoy the streets and the parks, but none has the right to in-
terfere with the enjoyment of public areas by others. Dispersion is a
relatively mild and inexpensive sanction but in many cases a highly
effective one. Official authority to dispose groups of their turf helps
squelch the notion that the groups "own" the area and often embold-
ens residents to cooperate with authorities to keep areas safe.2Y
21 As the Chicago City Council noted in the preamble to its revised anti-gang loitering ordi-
nance:
Members of criminal street gangs avoid arrest by committing no offense punishable un-
der existing laus when they know police are present, while maintaining control over
identifiable areas by continued loitering .... When police officers observe individuals
engaging in loitering and other suspicious activity they are often unable to make an ar-
rest, even though the persons engaged in that behavior will resume trafficking in narcot-
ics and controlled substances as soon as the police depart.
Revised Anti-Gang Ordinance at 1-2 (copy on file with author).
2 At the hearings on the Chicago ordinance, there was testimony that 'community residents
are often afraid to file formal complaints, serve as witnesses, or take other steps necessary to
prosecute criminal activity because of concerns for their own safety or the safety of their family
members or property." Brief for Petitioner at 3. City of Chicago v. Morales. 527 U.S. 41 (1999
(No. 97-1121). Even when cities take the less confrontational route of seeking injunctions
against gang activity, citizens remain fearful of complaining. Set Galto. 929 P.2d at 602 (recount-
ing city's findings in dealing with gang problems, including that "Iverbal harassment, physical
intimidation, threats of retaliation, and retaliation are the likely fate of anyone who complains
of the gang's illegal activities"). As a result, when a city files a nuismce action against gangs,
declarations by affected citizens are often filed under seal to prevent retaliation. See mfta notes
40-47 and accompanying text (describing civil efforts at gang abatement).
23 For a discussion of the law enforcement problems presented by gang loitering, see Brief
of Amicus Curiae Los Angeles County District Attorney at 14-18. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527
U.S. 41 (1999) (No. 97-1121).
24 The classic discussion of how "quality of life" laws, which are designed to control low-level,
marginally criminal behavior, have a large influence on a community is found in James Q. WVil-
son & George L Kelling, Broken llndouts, ATLANTIlC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982. at '29. For an up-
Feb. 20011
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
What confounds this solution is that the discretion given to the
police is inevitably quite broad. Identifying those who loiter in a
threatening or unpleasant manner necessarily calls for a great deal of
judgment, and the solution of dispersal (potentially followed by ar-
rest) is a crude tool. The guilty, the near guilty, and the wholly inno-
cent can get swept up in this remedy, disrupting legitimate activities
as easily as illegitimate ones. Most police officers do not plan the in-
tervention this way, but confronting and ordering a group to disperse
can be dangerous, making it understandable that, when the police do
intervene, they are looking for a complete, macro solution and not a
debate on whether the current gathering is comprised in significant
part of constitutionally-protected activity.
And of course, the sharp edge of excessive discretion is its ten-
dency to be exercised in a racially unbalanced manner. It is increas-
ingly common ground that young Black and Hispanic men are dis-
proportionately targeted by police for discretionary arrests, traffic
stops, Terry stops, and other forms of police intervention." Some of
this bias is deliberate, much of it is unconscious, but all of it can cause
harm, particularly to the law-abiding people about whom unfair as-
sumptions of criminality are made.26
So when a Morales-like ordinance comes along that rests nearly
complete discretion in the hands of the police, courts are properly
nervous. As scholars have noted, every statute gives police the ability
to enforce the law in an arbitrary way, but statutes that rest too much
subjectivity in the police virtually invite improper discrimination."
Police officers are probably no more free of conscious and uncon-
scious racial bias than the community at large, and so when given un-
dated discussion of the subject, see GEORGE L. KELLING & CATHERINE M. COLES, FIXING BROKEN
WINDOWS: RESTORING ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNITIES (1996). See also
Livingston, supra note 17, at 578-85.25 .. .
For empirical evidence that supports this belief, see OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
NEW YORK STATE, supra note 8. See also George Kelling, NAT'L INST. OFJUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, "Broken Windows" and Police Discretion 1 (1999) ("Many civil libertarians and advocates
for the homeless, for example, oppose order maintenance because they believe it infringes on
the liberties of selected populations .... Vagrancy and loitering laws, for example, have been
used to deny minorities their rights and to abuse citizens, especially African-Americans.").
26 See DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE 16-55 (1999); David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable
Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. LJ. 659 (1994); Dorothy E.
Roberts, Foreword. Race, Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of Order-Maintenance Policing 89 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775 (1999). For a particularly vivid description of the problem, see
Paul Buder, "Walking While Black". Encounters with the Police on My Street, LEGAL TIMEs, Nov. 10,
1997, at 23.
The harm to law-abiding citizens caused by police stereotyping is hard to measure. One
indicator of its effects, however, is the fear of being falsely arrested. According to one survey,
African-Americans are more than two and one-half times as likely to fear a false arrest as whites.
SOURCEBOOK 1998, supra note 19, at 111 tbl.2.29 (43% of blacks and 16% of whites over the age
of eighteen are "sometimes afraid that the police will stop and arrest [them] when [they] are
completely innocent").
See, e.g.,John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71
VA. L. REV. 189, 212-19 (1985); see also Livingston, supra note 17, at 608-18.
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fettered choices about which groups to disperse and arrest, we would
expect a certain percentage of those actions to reflect those biases.'
We are left, then, with police who are severely hampered in their
ability to prevent troublesome, threatening group activity unless they
can intervene and disrupt a group before a crime occurs. A statute
that allows this type of random intervention is problematic, however,
because it leaves the police free to operationalize their biases, con-
scious or unconscious, by unfairly targeting, dispersing, and arresting
racial minorities and other disfavored groups. What is needed is a
different legal structure, one that is faithful to Morales, that would al-
low the former while minimizing the opportunity for the latter.
B. The Limits ofMorales
There is much to like about the Supreme Court's opinion that in-
validated the Chicago ordinance. Most importantly, it shows the
Court taking seriously the concern of discriminatory enforcement of
the criminal law. Missing from the majority and plurality opinions
were the expected statements about the interests of effective law en-
forcement, and the often unstated assumption that police are pre-
sumed to act properly. There have now been several cases where the
Court has struck down loitering or vagrancy-like statutes, each time
being explicit that the fear of discriminatory police enforcement is
the primary problem with vague laws, even more so than the fear of
unfair surprise.3 More specifically, in each of these cases the Court
has shown a sensitivity to the risk that the poor and racial minorities
will be unfairly targeted by these laws.
The Court's heightened concern in these cases is welcome, but
puzzling. Morales was a close case with compelling arguments on
each side, and for the Court to uphold the interests of the gang
members and reject those of the people who must live with the street
disorder (to put the case in slanted terms) w%,as mildly surprising."
See Roberts, supra note 26, at 806 ("Police officers are particularly notorious for uing race
as aproxy for criminal propensity.").
See, eg., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 574 (1991); New York v. Quarls, 467 US.
649, 655 (1984).
See, eg., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 (1983) (explaining that v.agueness doc-
nine is designed both to prevent unfair surprise to those subject to the law and to present dis-
criminatory enforcement by police, with "the more important aspect [being] 'the requirement
that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement" (citation emitted)).
31 Fears of discriminatory enforcement were not the only problem with the Marate ordi-
nance. There was obviously some vagueness in the ordinance, and a chance (relatively remote)
that otherwise innocent people would be unfairly surprised by the manner in which the law ws
enforced. In particular, the Court was troubled by the lack of precision in the term 'loiter."
The ordinance defined it as "to remain in any one place with no apparent purpose." and many
Justices thought this standard created too great a risk that people of ordinary intelligence would
have to guess at when their purpose was "apparent" But there is little doubt that te heart of
the Morams holding was the fear that the police would use sweeping discretion in ways that
would harm disfavored groups.
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There have been many criminal procedure cases over the last thirty
years where there have been even greater risks of discriminatory po-
lice conduct, yet the Court has often seemed indifferent to the poten-
tial impact.32 Within the last few terms, cases like VWren, Armstrong,
and Wardlo 53 have put tremendous discretion in the hands of police
or prosecutors, yet the Court was unmoved by direct arguments about
the racial effect of the decisions that were ultimately made.
There are many possible explanations for the Court's sensitivity in
loitering law cases, some charitable-the Court just finds these types
of laws unusually ripe for abuse-others less so. Perhaps the best ex-
planation for the Court's behavior, however, reflects more adminis-
trative concerns than racial ones. It may be that Whren, Armstrong,
Wardlow, and now Morales can be viewed as a piece, with the unifying
theme that the Court does not want routine disputes over potentially
race-based motivations to play themselves out in court. Trying to un-
tangle the motivations of individual decision-makers may be too fre-
quent, too complex, too imprecise, and too ugly to make the case-by-
case method a palatable solution. Under this view, judicial aversion
to the issues sometimes results in setting impossibly high standards
(Armstrong), other times in making tests objective so that evidence of
motive becomes irrelevant (Whren). And maybe, when there is no
other way to avoid potential for huge numbers of recurring claims
based on race-recall there were 45,000 arrests under the original
Chicago ordinance3-it means getting rid of a statute entirely. '
This explanation is not completely satisfying, since the power to
invalidate an entire statute is a blunt and drastic measure. But to the
extent the idea has explanatory power, it offers an insight into the fu-
ture of loitering laws. Legislatures will continue to refine and narrow
these ordinances,36 but current reform efforts seem directed only at
sliding the balance between the need for police discretion and the
fear of police bias. But perhaps Morales is sending a different mes-
sage. If the courts are trying to bring the discretion of loitering laws
32 For a diverse discussion on this point, see Conference, Race, Law andJustice: The Rehnquist
Court and the American Dilemma, 45 Am. U. L. REV. 567 (1996). See also Craig M. Bradley, Criminal
Procedure in the Rehnquist Court: Has the Rehnquisition Begun?62 IND. L.J. 273 (1987).
53 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (holding that for Fourth Amendment pur-
poses, police officer's motivation for making traffic stop is irrelevant); United States v. Arm-
strong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996) (holding that claim of racial bias in prosecution decision requires
proof of discriminatory intent; defendant must make significant threshold showing of bias to
obtain discovery); Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000) (holding that flight from police in
high crime area can support finding of reasonable suspicion tojustify a Terry stop). Wrni and
Armstrongare discussed below in Part III.B.
See Brief for Petitioner at 16, City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) (No. 97-112 1)
("[W]e estimate that some 45,000 orders to disperse were issued under the ordinance anti
obeyed, and nearly the same number of arrests were made of those who failed to move on after
being ordered to do so.").
My thanks to Sharon Beckman at Boston College Law School for suggesting this line of
analysis.
See supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing revised ordinance).
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within judicially manageable limits, perhaps the laws should focus
more on the identity of those who should be dispersed, rather than on
the amorphous conduct that causes us concern. Singling out gang
members for special treatment was a halting step in this direction, but
perhaps there is room for refinement, one that would involve the
courts themselves in the targeting process.
II. A PROPOSAL
In designing a system that would channel discretion while still al-
lowing early police intervention, the hardest part is making valid dis-
tinctions among the range of people who are now targets of street-
sweeping laws. Some of the young men who spend time on the street
will commit crimes, most will not. Erring on the side of caution (or
less charitably, on the side of flexing their muscles) the police, we
fear, will sweep too broadly, disbanding or arresting the inchoate
criminal and the non-criminal alike, often using race as a proxy for
this distinction.
A second problem is that in the absence of evidence that a crime
is imminent, the prospective criminal has precisely the same right to
be free of police intrusion as any other citizen, meaning that the offi-
cer's authority to act against loitering is at its lowest constitutional
level. To justify intervention at this stage, the police must either
spend huge amounts of time monitoring behavior, or else be armed
with a broad statute that provides a facially legitimate way to disrupt
incipient crime.
A final problem is that we trust the police less than we trust other
parts of the criminal process, namely prosecutors and judges. There
are too many police officers to ensure quality control in decisionma k-
ing, the police necessarily make quick and fact-specific decisions that
are hard to reconstruct later, and they are by training and perhaps
temperament more prone to strike the balance in favor of crime con-
trol and against personal freedom. There are reasons, often good
ones, for these qualities, and judges and prosecutors are not pristine
in their own decisionmaking. But in constructing a better loitering
law, we would prefer at the threshold to have someone other than the
police make some of the discretionary decisions.
This combination of problems suggests a solution. When possi-
ble, we should leave to the courts the task of identifying those who
may not loiter, and we should limit those identif),ing opportunities to
cases where the targets' rights are at their lowest and the authority to
intervene is at its highest. Stated differently, we should target for in-
tervention those who already have broken the law, are already under
the court's supervision, and who already have the fewest rights of any
non-incarcerated citizen.
The proposal would work like this. After a conviction for any
group or gang-related crime, the court should impose as a condition
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of the sentence that while the defendant is not incarcerated, he must
for a certain time avoid specified places, certain people, or both.
Failure to do so would constitute a violation of the sentence, which
could result in any incarceration that was deferred in the conditional
sentence for the original crime. When the police see the person on
conditional release in a place where he should not be, or with people
with whom he should not associate, the officer would have the ability
to cause the person to disperse or be subject to arrest. In short, the
police should be given the authority that was (and is) extended in the
Chicago ordinance, but the law should only reach those who have
been previously labeled by the court as someone whose presence in
certain places and with certain people creates an unacceptable risk.3
The feasibility of the plan depends on several assumptions. The
first is that limiting the police's street-sweeping powers to "targeted"
individuals (those who have been ordered by a court not to loiter)
would be nearly as effective as the broader, Chicago-style statutes. It
is hard to know how valid this belief is, but it is intuitively appealing.
A large percentage of the people who loiter in ways that cause public
disruption have been through the criminal system before, and thus
have been or are at the time subject to restraints on their liberty."
Judges would thus have the opportunity to select those who seem par-
ticularly likely to repeat that behavior, and just as importantly, to in-
duce others to behave in a similar way. Every group has leaders and
followers, and while the banishment of some leaders from the group
could result in others filling the leadership vacuum, in many cases
the removal of the head will cripple the body. Prosecutors recognize
this feature when targeting the heads of organized crime families,just
37 This authority already exists in the federal courts and in some states. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §
3563(b) (Supp. 1998); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1204(2-A) (F) (West Supp. 1999). Other
states have extremely broad probation requirements that could be construed to cover the re-
strictions proposed here. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 948.03 (West 1996); IOWA CODE ANN. §
907.6 (West Supp. 2000) ("Probationers are subject to the conditions established by the judicial
district department of correctional services subject to the approval of the court, and any addi-
tional reasonable conditions which the court or district department may impose to promote
rehabilitation of the defendant or protection of the community.").
The requirement that the prior offense be group or gang-related would not be strictly
necessary; judges typically have a great deal of discretion in fashioning sentencing conditions to
fit the offender, rather than just the offense. See NEIL P. COHEN &JAIESJ. GOBERT, THE LAW
OF PROBATION AND PAROLE 188 (1983) (noting broad discretion in trial courts and parole
boards to impose conditions); see also Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 220 (1932) (in mak-
ing probation decision, "[i]t is necessary to individualize each case, to give that careful, hu-
mane, and comprehensive consideration to the particular situation of each offender which
would be possible only in the exercise of a broad discretion."). But as discussed below, banish-
ing a defendant from a certain area raises constitutional concerns, making it prudent to limit
the court's power to cases where there is a link between the restriction and the crime of convic-
tion. See Part III.A below.
38 See Hearing on Gang Activity Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 13 (1997)
[hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Stephen K. Wiley, Chief, Violent Crimes and Major Offend-
ers Section, FBI) ("Consistently, more than half of all gang members tend to be repeat offend-
ers.").
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as prison officials recognize this when they transfer gang leaders to
other facilities. "
A second assumption is a practical one: that those who are tar-
geted by the court will be identifiable by the police once they are
back on the street. At first blush this problem looms large, but on re-
flection there are several reasons to think it would not be fatal. Sev-
eral jurisdictions are already experimenting with targeted legal re-
straints, and their experience is instructive.0
Consider, for example, the ongoing efforts to use civil injunctions
to restrict gang activity. Several California cities " have brought civil
nuisance actions against identified gang members, seeking both geo-
graphic and associational restrictions on specific individuals.' If the
injunction is imposed, the police have the power to arrest those who
are found in the prohibited area or associating ith other identifiable
individuals. Violators can then be prosecuted for statutory criminal
contempt, a misdemeanor.4
As with the current proposal, identification of those who are un-
der civil restraint has been an issue. In injunction cases, the problem
is addressed in several ways. First, there is a belief that the officers
who regularly patrol an area come to know those who should not be
in the prohibited zone." Second, since the injunctive remedy is tied
See U.S. DEPT. OFJUSTIcE, PRISON GA.Gs, THEIR EXTE:\r. N.URE. D IPr O\" Ptuso.s
64-65 (1985) (discussing frequent use of power to transfer and isolate gang leaders as strategy to
disrupt prison gang activity); see also infra note 99.
For an overview of various efforts to use civil remedies to combat gang problems. see
Gregory S. Walston, Taking the Constitution at Its Word: A Defete of the tse of Ann-Gang Injunc-
tions, 54 U. MILAmi L RE%. 47 (1999); Christopher S. Yoo. Comment. The Constitutzonality of En-
joining Criminal Street Gangs as Public Nuisances, 89 NW. U. L REv. 212, 217 (1994) (discussing
use of injunctions in anti-gang efforts in seven California cities).
41 See Yoo, supra note 40, at 217-25 (describing injunctions); see also People ex re. Gallo v.
Acuna, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 589, 592 n.1 (CL App. 1995). rrvtu,, granted, depuhlshrd I 899 P.2d 66
(1995), superseded by 929 P.2d 596 (1997) (setting forth injunction issued in San Jose. Califor-
nia); Livingston, supra note 17, at 553-55 (describing Nonvalk, California. experience with civil
injunctions against gangs).
A SanJose injunction provided in part that certain named gang members were prohibited
from "[s]tanding, sitting, walking, driving, gathering or appearing anywhere in public view with
any other defendant herein, or with any other known 'VST' (Varrio Sureno Town or Varrio
Sureno Treces) or 'VSL' (Varrio Sureno Locos) member." Se Gallo, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 592 n.l.
Other injunctions preclude certain identified gang members from appearing in a seeral block
area that was particularly plagued with undesirable street activity. Telephone Interview uith
Carol Overton, SanJose City Attorney's Office (Mar. 16. 2000) [hereinafter Overton lnterview]
(notes on file with author). My thanks to Ms. Overton for her valuable assistance. For an ex-
tended discussion of the California experience. see Walston, supra note 40.
4 Overton Interview, supra note 42; Walston, supra note 40, at 57-58. The use of civil reme-
dies to solve problems traditionally managed through te criminal law is itself controversial, in
part because injunctions and similar actions are -unencunbered by the rigorous constitutional
protections associated with criminal trials, such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt, trial by
jury, and appointment of counsel." Se Mary M. Cheh. Constitutional Laruts on Using Crvil Remc-
dies to Achieve Criminal Law Objetives: Understanding and Transcending lit Crnmnal-Crt'l Law D0.
tintion, 42 HASTINGS. L.J. 1325, 1329 (1991); see also Livingston. supra note 17, at 640-45 (dis-
cussing implications of using civil injunctions).
4 Overton Interview, supra note 49. In San Jose. according to Ms. Overton. between thirty-
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almost exclusively to gang activity, there are often special police gang
units whose members would be in a better position to know and
monitor individual gang members." (Chicago had adopted such a
scheme in enforcing its original anti-gang loitering ordinance.)' Fi-
nally, the city of San Jose, and perhaps others, list the civil restrictions
found in the injunctions in the same place as they do outstanding ar-
rest warrants; if a police officer has questions or doubts about
whether a person is violating the injunction, she can check by radio
to see if a person is under a legal restriction, just as she would check
to see if there were outstanding wants or warrants.
These procedures should be sufficient to help police enforce the
targeted loitering law proposed here. Note, however, that greater po-
lice training would not be the only alternative; courts could also de-
cide to label offenders in a more literal sense. Similar to what is now
done with those subject to home arrest," those offenders who are
subject to geographic and associational limits could be required to
wear a wrist or ankle bracelet, not to permit their whereabouts to be
continuously tracked, but to identify them as a person under geo-
graphic and associational restrictions. Although this type of public
labeling is controversial, 9 there does not appear to be any insur-
mountable legal barrier to its use.5O
Once a person is subject to this kind of restriction, the police
should then have the ability to require the person to leave the group,
leave the neighborhood, or face arrest. Police would have discretion
in making this decision, of course, and might abuse it. The goal here
is not to eliminate discretion, however (an impossible and probably
eight and fifty gang members have been subject to injunctions. Prohibited areas have been four
square blocks in two instances, and nine square blocks in another. Id.
45 Id.
46 In regulations passed to guide enforcement of the now-invalid Chicago gang ordinance,
the city restricted the enforcement of the ordinance to members of the police gang crime sec-
tion and other designated personnel. See Brief for Petitioner at 6, Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S.
41 (1999) (No. 97-1121).
Overton interview, supra note 42.48
See 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(19) (Supp. 1998) (permitting courts to require probationers to
wear an electronic signaling device).
49 Requiring someone to publicly identify himself as a person under sentence or court su-
pervision gives rise to concerns about "shaming," a topic that has generated a lively and sophis-
ticated legal discussion. For a sample of the legal literature on this subject, see Stephen P. Gar-
vey, Can Shaming Punishments Educate?, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 733 (1998); Toni M. Massaro, Shame,
Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880 (1991); Eric Rasmusen, Stigma And
Self-Fulfilling Expectations Of Criminality, 39J.L. & ECON. 519 (1996); James Q. Whitman, What is
Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, 107 YALE L.J. 1055 (1998).
Although some appellate courts have reversed the imposition of shaming conditions on
probationers, they often do so because the trial judges lack the statutory authority to impose
such conditions. For a discussion of the relatively sparse case law on this topic, see Aaron S.
Book, Note, Shame On You. An Analysis Of Modern Shame Punishment As An Alternative To Incarcera-
tion, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 653, 660-70 (1999). See also Phaedra Athena O'Hara Kelly, Con-
ment, The Ideology Of Shame& An Analysis Of First Amendment and Eighth Amendment Challenges to
Scarlet-LetterProbation Conditions, 77 N.C. L. REv. 783, 787-803 (1999).
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undesirable task),5, but rather to restrict it to cases where the person
has already shown a propensity toward criminality and has already
been so adjudged by someone other than the officer on the street.
III. ADVANTAGES, QUESTIONS, AND COSTS
There would be at a least two advantages to this proposal over tra-
ditional loitering laws. The first is that there would no longer be a
need to define "loitering." Police would have the power to disperse
and ultimately arrest certain individuals who are likely to cause street-
level disruption, not because they are loitering (a tricky concept, even
if we know it when we see it),'52 but because they have no business be-
ing in the area to begin with. This not only helps remove the arbi-
trariness from an officer's decision to move someone along, but also
helps protect those who are not living under similar restrictions. Po-
lice anti-loitering powers would be limited to controlling those whose
movements are already regulated by court order.'"
A second advantage is that the proposal provides an intermediate
step between releasing defendants and incarcerating them. One frus-
tration in dealing with young offenders is that the sanctions for low-
level criminality often seem trivial to them at first, then suddenly be-
come extremely harsh. ' More generally, the problem of over-
51 Cf. Livingston, supra note 17. at 637 ('The problematic character of police discretion in
order maintenance does not disappear, however, merely because conduct prohibitions are rea-
sonably specific.").
52 There is an odd passage in the Moral/ plurality opinion on this point. Justice Sterns ac-
knowledges the Illinois Supreme Court's conclusion that the term 'loiter," standing alone, "may
have a common and accepted meaning," but concludes that the term as defined by the Chicago
ordinance does not. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999). The implication is that
if the City had left the term undefined it might have survived the vagueness challenge, a coun-
ter-intuitive notion. In any event, the City apparently decided not to test the suggestion-in its
revised ordinance, it defines "loitering" in greater detail than in the imalidated version. See
supra note 13.
The proposal obviously would not limit police powers over otheruise illegal or high-risk
conduct, including loitering with intent to commit an offense or loitering in a prohibited area.
Many states have passed these more-focused laws, which in general have been less vulnerable to
vagueness attacks. Sep eg., NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C33-2.1 (West 1995) (loitering for purpose of
illegally using, possessing, or selling controlled substance); N.Y. GEN. B's. Lw § 396-w
(McKinney 1996) (loitering for the purpose of soliciting passengers for transportation); RI.
GEN. LAWS § 11-34-8, 1956 (Michie 1994) (loitering for indecent purposes); S.C. CODE A.s,. §
24-1-270, 1976 (Law. Co-op. 1989) (loitering on correctional facility property); W. VA. CODE
AINT. § 61-6-14a (Bender 2000) (loitering on school property). CompamE.L. v. State, 619 So. 2d
252, 252-53 n.2 (Fla. 1993) (invalidating for vagueness and overbreadth an ordinance making it
a crime "to loiter in or near any public street, right of %y. or place open to the public . .. in a
manner and under circumstances manifesting the purpose to engage in drug related actities'
with City of Tacoma v. Luvene, 827 P.2d 1374 (Wash. 1992) (en bane) (sustaining constitution-
ality of similar ordinance). This proposal addresses only the most troublesome type of loitering
statute, that which makes loitering simpliciter grounds for police intervention.
See Nick Jackson, Comment, Internal Exie:- A Proposal For A Federal Systrm. 199 DETl. C.L
REV. 1085, 1105 ("One reason that intuitively explains why youthftil offenders do not have high
expectations of punishment is the fact of their youth itself. These offenders generally do not
Feb. 2001]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
incarceration, especially of young men of color, is well documented
and troublesome.55 Providing an intermediate step-banishing a de-
fendant from his neighborhood and prohibiting him from associat-
ing with his gang-may provide some of the incapacitative benefits of
prison without some of the malignant side effects.
There would be other benefits, 6 but a discussion of the costs
seems more pressing. Two questions suggest themselves: is the pro-
posal constitutional, and even if it is constitutional, do the benefits
outweigh the harms?
A. The Constitutionality
Limiting a person's ability to travel to certain areas or associate
with certain people would undoubtedly raise constitutional chal-
lenges. Ultimately, however, the most instinctive sources of con-
cern-the First and Fourteenth Amendments-should be no barrier.
The more serious concern is the similarity between the proposal and
the practice of banishing those convicted of crimes.
Ordering a person to stay out of a certain area is a facial restric-
tion on the right to travel. "[F]reedom to travel throughout the
United States has long been recognized as a basic right under the
Constitution,"5 7 and a court order prohibiting a person from being
present in a certain block or certain part of a city plainly limits that
mobility.
58
But this right is not nearly so broad as its title suggests. Courts
have long had the authority to impose geographic limits on convicted
defendants as a condition of probation, as have executive agencies in
setting parole conditions. The federal probation statute, for exam-
ple, provides that as a condition of release, courts may order that a
have sufficient hard-time experience to fear the criminal justice system.").
55 In 1996 roughly 774,000 African-Americans, about seven percent of the black population,
were held in prisons or jails in this country. See SOURCEBOOK 1998, supra note 19, at 480
tbl.6.24. In contrast, there were roughly 822,000 whites held in prison or jails that same year,
slightly more than one percent of the white population. Id. Different rates of crime commis-
sion probably explain some, but not all, of the disparity. For a discussion of how drug laws, se n-
tencing schemes, and prosecutorial decision making influence these numbers, see COLE, supra
note 26, at 141-53.
"6 Actually, other benefits would come from any proposal that split the difference between
having a Morales-type ordinance and no loitering law at all. Allowing some police intervention
would improve the quality of life in many neighborhoods, while limiting the law's reach to
those convicted defendants targeted by the courts would reduce the costs of misused police dis-
cretion. Whether this middle ground strikes an appropriate balance (a more difficult question)
is discussed below.
57 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-31 (1969); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745,
758 (1966); see alsoEdwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 173-74 (1941).
58 See, e.g., In reWhite, 158 Cal. Rptr. 562 (Cal. App. 3d 1979) (finding unreasonable a pro-
bation condition forbidding probationer from being in specified "map areas" at "any time,
night or day"); see also People v. Beach, 195 Cal. Rptr. 381, 385-87 (Cal. App. 3d 1983) (finding
probation condition that required defendant to relocate from her home overbroad and an un-
reasonable interference with the right to travel).
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defendant "refrain from frequenting specified kinds of places or from
associating unnecessarily with specified persons," that he "reside in a
specified place or area, or refrain from residing in a specified place
or area," and that he "remain at his place of residence during non-
working hours." 9 Defendants who challenge these conditions have
had mixed results, but the prevailing judicial view is that as long as
the prohibited area is relatively small and specific, the condition will
be upheld. Thus, for example, sentencing conditions that bar a de-
fendant from being present near schools, near a naval base,' in
places where liquor is sold,6 or in a specific store ' have been af-
firmed.
In contrast, efforts to expand the prohibited zone beyond discrete
areas are usually (but not always) invalidated, particularly when the
reviewing court suspects that the sentencing judge was simply trying
to move the defendant on to some other jurisdiction. Thus, condi-
tions that a defendant leave the country, state, county," city,"" or
18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(6), (13), (19) (Supp. 1998); see also 28 C.F.R. § 2.40(a) (3). (10)
(1998) (mandatory conditions of parole that defendant not leave geographic area fixed by his
parole and not associate .ith people with criminal records without permission from parole offri-
cer); id. § 2.40(e) (can require as conditions of parole that parolee remain at residence during
nonworking hours and wear electronic monitoring deice); id. § 2.41 (requiring that person on
parole obtain permission from commission for foreign travel); cf. 18 U.S.C. §3142(c) (1) (B) (iv)
(1994) (ability of courts to restrict movement and association during pretrial release).
60 See In re Dunn, 488 P.2d 902, 902-03 (Mont. 1971) (per curiam) (upholding sentence
condition that defendant not be found near certain elementary. junior high, and high schools.
and that he not be found in the company of any person under the age of 18).
61 See United States v. Lowe, 654 F.2d 562, 567-68 (9th Cir. 1981) (affirming probation con-
dition prohibiting probationer from going within 250 feet of a naval base where she had presi-
ously protested).
See State v. Harrington, 336 S.E.2d 852, 857 (N.C. CL App. 1985) (upholding probation
condition that defendant "[niot go upon the premises of any business or private dub licensed
by the State of North Carolina for the sale or on the premises [for the] consumption of alco-
holic beverages between 8:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. the following day").
See Dukes v. State, 423 So. 2d 329, 331 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982) (upholding six-month pro-
bation condition that defendant stay out of the store where she shoplifted).
6 See United States v. Abushaar, 761 F.2d 954, 958-61 (3d Cr. 1985) (holding that a proba-
tion condition that probation time be served outside of the country is impermissible)- In re Ba-
bak S., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893, 897-98 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that a probation condition
thaouvenile live with relatives in Iran is invalid).
SeeHenry v. State, 280 S.E.2d 536, 536 (S.C. 1981) (invalidating probation condition that
would have banished defendant from the state in the event of a violation); State v. Doughtie, 74
S.E.2d 922, 924 (N.C. 1953) (suspending sentence on the condition that defendant leave the
state for two years is effectively banishment and therefore void); People v. Baum, 231 N.W. 95,
96 (Mich. 1930) (holding banishment from state for five years an improper condition of sen-
tence).
66 SeeJohnson v. State, 672 S.M.2d 621,623 (Tex. CL App. 1984) (holding a probation con-
dition that banished defendant from county invalid as not reasonably related to rehabilitation
and unduly restrictive of liberty); People v. 0, 321 N.Y.S.2d 518, 519 (N.Y. App. Div. 1971)
(holding judge abused his discretion by revoking probation where condition violated i,-s re-
entering county without permission); People v. Blakeman, 339 P.2d 202, 202-03 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1959) (holding court had no authority to banish defendant from countv as condition of
probation).
See State ex reL Baldwin v. Alsbury, 223 So. 2d 546, 547 (Fla. 1969) (holding improper the
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certain parts of the city" have regularly been struck down. A few
courts, however, have been more willing to export their problem citi-
zens. Thus, a Georgia court upheld an order that banished the de-
fendant from every county in the state except one, an area described
by defendant's lawyer as a "remote, sparsely populated area" in the
south-central part of the state.69 Federal courts have also upheld as
conditions of parole that the person remain outside the state for
70many years.
This cautious exercise in line-drawing emerges from a fear of im-
posing a sentence of "banishment" or "exile" on the defendant.
There is a long historical tradition of expelling those who violate the
norms of the community,7' but banishment has never been popular
in this country as a state-imposed sanction for crimes. Some states
have abolished the practice in their constitutions,7' and even when
indefinite suspension of a sixty day jail sentence in return for defendant's agreement to leave
town); State v.Jacobs, 692 P.2d 1387, 1389 (Or. Ct. App. 1984) (holding probation requirement
that defendant move out of city was impermissibly broad).68 SeeJones v. State, 727 P.2d 6, 8 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986) (invalidating probation condition
that required person to stay out of forty-five block "high crime district" for one year); In re
White, 158 Cal. Rptr. 562, 566 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (invalidating prohibition on person being in
certain part of city); Almond v. State, 350 So. 2d 810, 810-11 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (per cu-
riam) (invalidating requirement that person leave "Central Florida" because the condition was
impermissibly vague).
69 State v. Collett, 208 S.E.2d 472, 474 (Ga. 1974); Win. Garth Snider, Banishment: The His-
tory of Its Use and a Proposal for Its Abolition Under the First Amendment, 24 NEW ENG. J. ON GRIM. &
CI. CONFINEMENT 455, 455 (1998); see also Flick v. State, 285 S.E.2d 58, 58 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981)
(upholding probation condition of banishment from judicial district).
There are other reasons for rejecting the application of the general "right to travel" doc-
trine in this context. Not every geographic limit will interfere with the right to interstate travel,
the right described in the Supreme Court's case law. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,
630-31 (discussing right to travel among states); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758-59
(same). But see White, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 567 ("We conclude that the right to intrastate travel
(which includes intramunicipal travel) is a basic human right protected by the United States
and California Constitutions as a whole."). As described below in Part III.B., the current pro-
posal would be limited to banishment from an area that is smaller than the political jurisdic-
tion, and thus should not interfere with any right to interstate travel.
70 See, e.g., Bagley v. Harvey, 718 F.2d 921, 924 (9th Cir. 1983) (upholding parole condition
banishing person from state, subject to a few exceptions); cf. Carchedi v. Rhodes, 560 F. Supp.
1010, 1013-19 (S.D. Ohio 1982). In Carchedi, the court upheld a parole condition that the de-
fendant not return to Ohio for forty years, the balance of his permissible sentence. Although
the court was plainly worried about the constitutionality of the banishment, it found that de-
fendant had originally suggested this condition on his parole, had obtained his release in ex-
change for agreeing to leave the state, and thus would not be permitted to object. Id. at 1018-
19.71 "The ancient civilizations of Babylon, Greece, and Rome employed banishment, and Eng-
land made extensive use of it for centuries. By the mid-nineteenth century, however, the Eng-
lish lost interest in banishing citizens." Michael F. Armstrong, Banishment: Cruel and Unusual
Punishment, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 758, 759 (1963) (footnotes omitted).
72 See Snider, supra note 69, 464-65 (discussing the history of banishment in Russia). Note
also that a large number of settlers in the United States came because they had been banished
from England. Id. at 462 (noting that "nearly 50,000 people were banished to America from
the British Isles") (citing A. ROGER EKIRCH, BOUND FOR AMERIcA 27 (1987)).See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 30 ("no citizen shall be exiled"); ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 21
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states permit it,74 the practice does not appear to be idespread.-
Characterizing the current proposal as "banishment" is an exag-
geration; mostjudicial orders that would limit the defendant's choice
of areas and comrades would be far more modest than an "exile" in
the classic sense.;6 Many street gangs have limited areas of influence,
and thus a restricted area of even several blocks ill often be enough
to serve the purpose.d But separating people from their communi-
ties shares enough worrisome qualities with banishment that a com-
parison is appropriate.
There have been several justifications offered for the periodic re-
jection of this form of sanction. Some courts have reasoned that ex-
ile is improper because it is unrelated to the purposes of punishment
and thus is simply the arbitrary infliction of harm." This analysis may
("nor shall any person, under any circumstances, be exiled from die State'); GA. CONST. art. 1,
§ 1, 21 ("Neither banishment beyond the limits of the state nor whipping shall be allo%ed as a
punishment for crime"); see also Snider, supra note 69. at 465 ("Currently. there are at least fif-
teen states that have provisions in their constitutions explicitly forbidding the banishment of
individuals from their state." (foomote omitted)).
74 See eg., M.Ass. CoNST. pt. 1, art. 12 ('no subject shall be arrested, imprisoned ... exiled or
deprived of his life, liberty, or estate, but by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land");
N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 15 (same); see also COHEN & GOBERT. supra note 37 at 261-65 01983 &
1998 Supp.).
,- The Supreme Court has not passed on the validity of banishment directly, although one
of its early cases elliptically raised the issue. In Cooper v. Tdfair. 4 U.S. 14 (180ti. die Georgia
legislature banished one of its citizens and confiscated his property for committing treason by
siding with the British during the American revolution. In upholding the legislative action, the
Court did not consider the exile question, but two of the fourJustices who heard die case as-
sumed that the power to banish existed. See id. at 19 (Paterson, J.) ("[T]he power of confisca-
tion and banishment does not belong to thejudicial authority [under the facts of this casel and
yet, it is a power that grows out of the very nature of the social compact, which must reside
somewhere," and thus resides in the legislature); id. at 19 (Cushing,J.) (-The right to confiscate
and banish, in the case of an offending citizen, must belong to every govenmment.'). Cf. Olim v.
Waldnekona, 461 U.S. 238, 252-53 n.1 (1983) (MarshallJ., dissenting) ('Wiether it is called
banishment, exile, deportation, relegation, or transportation, compelling a person 'to quit a
city, place, or country, for a specified period of time, or for life.' has long been considered a
unique and severe deprivation, and was specifically outlawed by itihe twelfth section of the
English Habeas Corpus Act, 31 Car. II, one of the three great muniments of English liberty.'
(quoting United States v.Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253,269-70 (1905) (BrewerJ., disenting))).
76 Historically, banishment was an extremely harsh form of punishment, because remorning
the defendant from his land and his community often deprived him of any means of protecting
himself from hostile members of other tribes or communities. Set gneral Snider, supra note
69, at 459-63 (discussing historical uses of banishment and transportation). As disclsed belo..,
the current proposal contemplates a much more modest (although still potentially burden-
some) exclusion.
,7 This will not always be true; some gangs are extremely large. and hale chapters in cities
across the country. See Haring, supm note 38, at 2 (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (noting that
Bloods and Crips gangs had syndicated in 118 cities, while another gang, tie Gangsta Disciples,
had expanded throughout the Midwest).
8 See State i re. Halverson v. Young, 154 N.W.2d 699, 702 (Minn. 1967) (banishment from
state as a condition of probation is "unauthorized by statute, is contrary to public policy. and is
repugnant to the underlying policy of the probation law, which is to rehabilitate offenders
without compromising the public safety");Johnson v. State, 672 S.\V.2d 621. 623 (Tex. Ct. App.
1984) ("banishing defendant from the county, particularly when lie is broke and unemployed is
not reasonably related to his rehabilitation").
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be true in some cases, but in the loitering context it probably is not.
Selectively removing people who have engaged in group criminality
from their group and from their home turf should at a minimum re-
move some of the temptations and opportunities for further crime,
which serves both the rehabilitative and, indirectly, incapacitative
goals of the criminal law. 9 Removing the defendant from his com-
munity carries some punitive aspects as well, making it, within the
limits set by the underlying crime, a legitimate penological end.8"
A second, and related, argument is that banishment violates the
Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.8'
It appears that banishment in any meaningful sense is relatively un-
common, so as a condition of parole or probation, it is "unusual" in
the sense of being rare. It also is possible to imagine a court order
that was so severe in its impact-one that prevented a defendant from
holding any job or ever seeing his family-that it would be completely
out of proportion to the harm caused by the crime of conviction.
On balance, however, this argument is unpersuasive as a matter of
both logic and law. Banishment could have serious consequences for
a defendant, but it is surely less cruel than the alternative sanction of
incarceration. While imposing this type of restriction on a defendant
is now relatively uncommon, challenges to the death penalty have
shown that infrequency of application does not itself make punish-
ment "unusual" in an Eighth Amendment sense. The Supreme
Court's case law in this area, while jumbled, also makes it clear that
for non-capital sentences, the legislature's discretion over the disposi-
tion of convicted defendants is extremely broad.83 Finally, an Eighth
See Bagley v. Harvey, 718 F.2d 921, 925 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that banishment from
state was not arbitrary and capricious: "[o]n this record, the Commission could have reasona-
bly concluded that a new community would be less hostile to Bagley's return to society, and that
a new start in Iowa where his parents reside would contribute to Bagley's rehabilitation.").80 See Cobb v. Mississippi, 437 So. 2d 1218, 1221 (Miss. 1983) (upholding probation condi-
tion that required defendant to stay more than 125 miles away from home county, even though
it meant he had to live apart from his family; "Some amount of punitive aspects of probation
serve the public interest as well as the probationer's interest.").
8! See Dear Wing Jung v. United States, 312 F.2d 73, 76 (9th Cir. 1962) (holding that ban-
ishment from a country as a condition of a suspended sentence is either cruel and unusual pun-
ishment or a denial of due process); cf Carchedi v. Rhodes, 560 F. Supp. 1010, 1015 (S.D. Ohio
1982) (finding that banishment from state has been viewed as cruel and unusual punishment
under some circumstances, but upholding parole condition on procedural grounds). For a
dated but still interesting discussion of this point, see Armstrong, supra note 71.
82 Cf Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910) (finding cadena temporal cruel and un-
usual); see alsoSnider, supra note 69, at 491 ("[S]ince banishment has been used as a condition
of a parole or pardon almost continuously since the founding of the Republic, a defendant
cannot successfully argue that the mode of punishment is so barbaric as to shock the modern
day conscience." (footnote omitted)).83
See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991). Although large pieces of the opinions in
Harmelin are plurality rather than majority views, there were five votes for the position that, ex-
cept for in the most extreme cases, legislatures have free reign in setting the punishment for
crimes. See id. at 985-88 (Scalia, J.); id. at 998-1000 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and con-
curring in the judgment). Interestingly, it is Justice Scalia's opinion,joined only by ChiefJus-
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Amendment challenge would have to overcome some strong Ninfl
Circuit reasoning, which found that banishment from Washington
state during probation was not cruel and unusual."' The appeals
court there correctly reasoned that because incarcerated people can
be sent to other states to serve their jail terms," it is less punitive, and
thus within Eighth Amendment bounds, to require that parole be
served outside the state.86
There is one other constitutional argument that causes concern.
Preventing people from associating xith others or congrep ting in
certain places may rub the First Amendment the wvrong %way. A con-
ditional sentence ordering a defendant not to keep company with
certain people implicates the rights of free speech and association;
the exiled person may be prevented from gathering wvith friends to
socialize or may have diminished ability to work with others to engage
in political activity to bring about social change.- As one commenta-
tor explains:
rice Rehnquist, that may provide the better basis for challenging an order banning defendants
from particular areas. See i&, at 976 (Eighth Amendment "disables the Legislature from author-
izing particular forms or 'modes' of punishment-specificaly. cruel methods of punishment
that are not regularly or customarily employed"). It seems unlikely. however, that man mem-
bers of the Court would view the type of banishment imposed here as being -cruel" in a consti-
tutional sense.
8 Bag&), 718 F.2d at 925.
s5 See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 248-50 (1983). In Olim, the Court rejected an ar-
gument that a prison transfer between Haaii and the mainland us analogous to banishmenL
It concluded that "respondent in no sense has been banished; his conviction, not the transfer.
deprived him of his right freely to inhabit the State .... Moreover, respondent has not been
exiled; he remains within the United States." Id. at 248 n.9.
s6 Bagley, 718 F.2d at 925. But cf. Ray v. McCoy. 321 S.E.2d 90, 92 (W. Va. 19-1) (holding
that incarceration of state inmates beyond state borders violates West Virginia Constitution's
ban on forced "transportation" of inmates).
87 See, e g., In reBabak S., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893. 897 (Cal. App. 1993) ('Conditions of banish-
ment affect the probationer's basic constitutional rights of freedom of trael. association and
assembly.").
8 In Roberts v. United Stales Jaycces, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984), the Court described tto re-
lated interests protected by the First Amendment freedom of association: the right to -enter
into and maintain certain intimate human relationships" and the right to "-associate for the
purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First Amendnent." such as group po-
litical activity. See also City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 24-25 (1989) (appling / Rrn).
The Court in Morales was dismissive of the associational interests of the gang members. Se 327
U.S. 41, 52-53 (1999) (plurality) (holding anti-gang ordinance 'does not have a suflicienthi sub-
stantial impact on conduct protected by the First Amendment to render it unconstitutional ....
Its impact on the social contact between gang members mid others does not impair die First
Amendment 'right of association' that our cases have recognized." (citing Stang sn). Howc-er.
the issue may be closer than the Court suggests. While it is true that many gangs are large or-
ganizations with a loose structure and little selectivity in membership, other gangs, or subsets of
gangs, may be precisely the place where disenfranchised young men form their closest associa-
tional bonds. See, eg.,James Diego Vigil &-John M. Long, Emir and Ette Perspwttws on Gang Cut
turm The Chicano Cas4 in GANGS IN AMERIcA 55, 60-66 (C. Ronald Huff ed.. 19901 (dtscussing
the importance of gangs in their members' lives). Thus, it may be that certain Otp of associa-
tions among gang members, if disrupted by law, would present a tougher First Ainendiient
case.
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When one is banished, one is separated not only from the citizens that
would most benefit from his voice, but also from the politicians that
would most likely have an interest in seeing that his voice is heard. One
of the inherent problems with banishment, however, is that many times it
is the local politicians who are least receptive to the voice of the ban-
ished ...
In addition, the argument continues, the rights of those in the
group from which the defendant is excluded are also infringed. Just
as the families of prisoners have a constitutional interest in maintain-
ing contact with their incarcerated relative,"° the associates of a ban-
ished person may have a constitutional interest in being able to effec-
tively communicate with those who have been expelled.
This concern argues against sweeping exile orders, but not against
the proposal per se. Even assuming that gang activity of the type dis-
rupted by a dispersal order is covered by the First Amendment, once
again the parallel is not between a banished person and a free citizen,
but rather between a banished person and an incarcerated one. The
government obviously has the ability to severely limit a convicted per-
son's familial, associational, and political rights, provided that the
limits are not imposed arbitrarily and are incident to the compelling
government interest in punishing those who commit crimes.92 While
it is always risky to rely on "the greater power includes the lesser" ar-
gument, here the power to incarcerate, and thus restrict or control all
communications, must surely include the more limited power of pre-
venting that person from directly communicating with at least some
89 Snider, supra note 69, at 495-96. See generally Terence R. Boga, Note, Turf Wars: Street
Gangs, Local Governments, and the Battle for Public Space, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 477, 494
(1994) (discussing anti-gang injunctions' impact on constitutional right to free association).
90 Cf Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 409 (1974), overruled on other grounds by Thorn-
burgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989) ("The wife of a prison inmate who is not permitted to
read all that her husband wanted to say to her has suffered an abridgment of her interest in
communicating with him as plain as that which results from censorship of her letter to him.").
91 First Amendment protection is not a foregone conclusion here. Compare Judge Mosk's
dissent in Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 630 n.9 (Cal. 1997) (suggesting that "[t]he right to walk
the streets, or to meet publicly with one's friends for a noble purpose or for no purpose at
all ... is rooted in the First Amendment's protection of freedom of expression and association"
(quoting Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1125, 1134 (D.D.C. 1989))) with Walston, supra note 40,
at 61-70 (arguing that street gangs are not protected associations under the First Amendment).
See also supra note 88.
See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5B1.3(c) (9) (1999) (recommending as a
"standard" condition of probation that the defendant "not associate with any persons engaged
in criminal activity, and shall not associate with any person convicted of a felony unless granted
permission to do so by the probation officer"); see also Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Pa-
role v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 359-60, 364 (1998) (exclusionary rule does not apply to warrantless
searches of parolee's residence; noting, without deciding, the state's ability to obtain waiver of
the warrant requirement from an inmate as a condition of parole); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471, 480 (noting that a parolee is not entitled to "the full panoply" of due process rights to
which a criminal defendant is entitled); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 872-76 (1987) (per-
mitting a warrantless search of probationer's home where officers only had reasonable suspi-
cion of probation violation).
[Vol :1
TARGETED LOITERING LA IS
others.93
More pointedly, the proposal in its narrowest form contemplates
only one type of communication: face to face, and in public. A de-
fendant would not as a matter of course be restricted from talking
with friends on the telephone, or from meeting with them in a non-
public place, or from meeting with them outside the prohibited
area. A carefully drawn sentencing condition should create no
more First Amendment concern than any other type of restriction
now imposed."5
In short, the proposal is not advocating the extension of any
power that does not already exist. It does advocate a more aggressive,
more targeted use of the power to restrict those who have violated
the law, and to do so in the context of public, gang-related behavior.
Judges should be encouraged, by legislation if necessary, to impose
geographic and associational limits on those who seem particularly
likely to cause problems if they are allowed to return to their pre-
conviction practices. Police in turn should be encouraged to develop
methods for identifying and monitoring those who are under these
restrictions. While great care would be required both in the court-
room and on the street to avoid constitutional pitfalls, this is no more
of a requirement than should be demanded in the normal course of
judicial or police work.
To say that the idea is constitutional, of course, is not to say that it
is wise. The next section considers some prudential concerns.
B. Thw Wirisdom
The proposal raises at least two related worries. First, banishing
people from one area may simply shift the problem to some other
q3 See generaly O-iffin, 483 U.S. at 874 ("To a greater or lesser degree. it is alays true of pro-
bationers (as we have said it to be true of parolees) that they do not enjoy 'the absolute liberty
to which every citizen is entitled, but only... conditional liberty properly dependent on obser-
vance of special restrictions.'" (citation and bracketed material omitted)); Carchedi v. Rhodes,
560 F. Supp. 1010, 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1982) ("Once released on parole. a convict may not be enti-
tled to the full range of rights accorded other citizens, and the government may impose upon
the parolee certain conditions of liberty which would be unconstitutional if applied to ordinary
individuals.").
94 There may be limits on a person's ability to meet or speak with some people (convicted
felons, for example) at all under other terms of probation or parole. Se supra note 59 and ac-
companying text. This proposal is only concerned about the public loitering part of defen-
dant's behavior, although admittedly it could add to other sentencing conditions imposed by
the court or to release conditions imposed by a parole board.
95 Case law largely supports this conclusion. Seeg.. United States v. Albanese, 554 F.2d 543.
546-47 (2nd Cir. 1977) (upholding a condition that probationer associate only with law abiding
citizens); United States v. Adderly, 529 F.2d 1182, 1183 (5th Cir. 1976) (upholding a probation
revocation because probationer violated requirement that he associate only uith law-abiding
persons); Malone v. United States, 502 F.2d 554,556-57 (9th Cir. 1974) (upholding a probation
condition precluding probationer from participating in the American Irish Republican mo.e-
ment).
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neighborhood, resulting in no net societal benefit. Second, there is a
risk that the police and courts would use their power to banish for
more than just disrupting gangs; they may instead use it as a crude
form of social engineering, moving aggressively to drive "undesir-
ables" from their jurisdiction and thereby bringing back in the dis-
criminatory practices that the proposal hoped to avoid.
9 6
1. Moving the Problem
Courts that invalidate banishment orders sometimes do so on the
ground that these orders violate public policy. 7 Although often un-
articulated, the reasoning behind invalidation seems to be that ban-
ning criminals from one area does not solve any crime problem but
only relocates it, and that notions of comity discourage one jurisdic-
tion from exporting its problems to another."
Dumping convicted criminals on other jurisdictions is unappeal-
ing, but the concerns are probably exaggerated as there are at least
two offsetting benefits. First, it seems unlikely that displaced people
in general will engage in crime to the same degree as they would by
remaining in their home environment. Much of the harm that is
These are not the only concerns. Targeting people as unwsorthy of being seen in public or
in the company of others raises concerns about stigmatizing the offender, a problem that is
compounded when some type of physical marking is used. See, e.g., KAREN L. KINNEAR, GANGS
7-8 (1996) (discussing "labeling theory" and risk of creating self-fullfilling prophecy in identify-
ing sources of potential anti-social behavior). There is also the concern that by labeling people
to a greater degree than is now done, the proposal will be antithetical to rehabilitation. One
obvious reason for anti-social conduct is the person's lack of connection with the community,
and formalizing the disconnect may intensify those feelings. Removing a person from an area
will prevent contacts with good influences as well as bad, and indiscriminate use of banishment
could leave the person rootless, perhaps leading him to have even less concern about socia
rules and norms.
Nonetheless, the question is not whether the labeling is good or bad in the abstract, but
whether the proposed distinction is better than the status quo. Minority race citizens need not
be reminded that many people already generalize on the basis of skin color and that because a
disproportionate number of young minority men commit crimes, people often become fearful
and biased against all men in those groups, including the much larger group of law-abiding
members. Labeling people-with bracelets, distinctive clothes, or otherwise-could help re-
draw those lines and encourage people to limit their fears to people already found to be law-
breakers, rather than to racial or ethnic groups. Nonetheless, the risks of physically labeling
people make this the weakest part of the proposal, one that would require further study if the
police were unable to otherwise identify those subject to court restrictions.
97 See People v. Blakeman, 339 P.2d 202, 203 (Cal. App. 1959); State ex rel. Halverson v.
Young, 154 N.W.2d 699, 702 (Minn. 1967); cf. State v. Doughtie, 74 S.E.2d 922, 924 (N.C. 1953)
(invalidating a "road sentence" as effectively a banishment and therefore against public policy).See Rutherford v. Blankenship, 468 F. Supp. 1357, 1360 (W.D. Va. 1979) ("To permit one
state to dump its convict[ed] criminals into another is not in the interests of safety and welfare;
therefore, the punishment by banishment to another state is prohibited by public policy." (cita-
tions omitted));Johnson v. State, 672 S.W.2d 621, 623 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (noting with disap-
proval that "[t]he State of Georgia apparently does permit one political subdivision to dump
persons it considers undesirable upon another" (citation omitted)); cf. Yadyaser v. State, 430 So.
2d 884, 888 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983) (affirming a probation condition requiring an Iranian na-
tional defendant to purchase a one-way ticket to Iran).
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meant to be prevented by street-sweeping statutes depends on group
behavior, and groups take time and some measure of trust to de-
velop. It is unrealistic to believe that a gang member who is pre-
vented from associating with his group or from congregating on his
turf will promptly enter into the same kind of relationship and en-
gage in the same conduct somewhere else, at least in the short term."
Second, moving the problem to another part of the city or state
(to the extent that it occurs) should help spread the costs of law en-
forcement more equitably. Randall Kennedy and others have written
about the need to spread the "tax" of more rigorous police practices
evenly among groups."'° One explanation that has been offered for
the majority's willingness to press for increasingly more intrusive law
enforcement is that the impact of these practices is imposed dispro-
portionately on minority groups. Moving high risk individuals to
other areas, however, may lead to a wider dispersion of policing ef-
forts, which may in turn check the enthusiasm people feel for increas-
ingly rigorous policing methods.' 'While this would admittedly im-
pose a cost on the outlying areas, that cost might be more than offset
by the increased benefit to the law-abiding citizens of the neighbor-
hood from which the person was banished.
Nonetheless, the fear of dumping is legitimate, and the proposal
should be modified accordingly. In imposing a geographic restric-
tion on a defendant, a judge should not have the power to exclude
the person in a way that would force him outside the political division
where the court resides. Thus ajudge would not be able to bar a de-
fendant from appearing anywhere in the city, county, or district un-
der the court's supervision, thereby ensuring political accountability
by forcing the sentencing area to internalize the costs associated with
the defendant's dislocation. Stated differently, there should be no
incentive for the court, prosecutor, and police to push the limits on
99 Thus, authorities often use their powers to transfer or othenise isolate gang member in-
mates in dealing with gang problems in prison. See U.S. DEPT. oFJusTfcE, supra note 39. at 64-
65. Although this "bus therapy" risks spreading the gang problem to other institutions, id. at
22, administrators apparently believe that overall the strategy is useful. Id. at 65. Sre also supra
note 79 and accompanying text.
It also is worth noting that, in the opinion of the San Jose City Attorney's Office, the dis-
persal of gangs through injunctive geographic restrictions as described above has not resulted
in gangs reconstituting just outside the prohibited zone. Overton Interview, supra note 42 and
accompanying text; see also Walston, supra note 40, at 50 n.34 (noting that after gang ordinance
wasput in place, "crime did not shift to surrounding areas as some critics predicted').
See Randall Kennedy, Suspect Pofiy, THE NEWV REPULBUC, Sept 13 & 20, 1999. at 30.
101 David Cole makes this point in a slightly different context:
If well-to-do white people were routinely stopped, questioned. and searched, there %ould
likely be more community pressure on the police to regulate themselves. We would
likely find more sympathy within the legislative, executive, and judicial branches for pro-
tecting those subjected to such tactics. Restrictions on police behavior would soon de-
velop. If those restrictions turned out to impede law enforcement too greatly, we would
be forced as a community to reach a consensus on where the appropriate line should be
drawn-for eveoone-between crime control and privacy interests.
COLE, supra note 26, at 54.
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the excluded zone in a way that simply exports the problem defen-
dant to another political entity.
2. Forced Relocation
There is a related risk created by the aggressive displacement of
gang members. History shows a troubling tendency of societies to
target and drive away those who are different by moving them from
the center to the fringes of the community, and eventually out of it
entirely.102  A tool that would allow the geographic or associational
dislocation of disfavored group members could pave the way for
those in power to use it offensively in redefining the community ac-
cording to their own tastes, rather than defensively as means of com-
bating crime.02
The superficial response is that the proposal contains a safeguard:
that before a person can be dislocated he must commit a crime, a
path no one is compelled to choose. There are obviously greater so-
cial, economic, and peer pressures on some people than others to
break the law, but the existence of large numbers of people who re-
sist those temptations belies a wholly-fatalist vision of behavior. Thus,
the argument continues, even if police and prosecutors were inter-
ested in driving out certain groups, they could only do so after mem-
bers of the group had been shown in court to have exhibited anti-
social behavior.
There is much truth in this response, but the risk remains. The
danger that dislocation would become an offensive tool is relatively
small under a law enforcement model of passive response to commit-
102 Consider that:
many blacks migrated north in the early 1900s because of their resentment of the law-
enforcement tactics in southern counties where officials were paid a bounty for every
man arrested. "Large numbers of Black men were rounded up for petty infractions of
the law such as littering and disorderly conduct. Others were arrested on various
charges of suspicion. Heavy fines were often levied for such small violations, and fre-
quently those who could not pay were imprisoned." Black men were arrested "when the
labor market was in low supply and workers were needed for road work, ensuring that
poor or working-class black males would have to spend time in prison."
Jerome G. Miller, African American Males In The Criminal Justice System, 78 PHi DELTA KAI'PAN,
June 1997, at K1, K5 (quoting Shirley Ann Vining Brown, Race as a Factor in the Intra-Prison
Outcomes of Youthful First Offenders (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michi-
gan)).
Cf Snider, supra note 69, at 458 ("[B]anishment allows members of the judiciary and ex-
ecutive branches to unconstitutionally rearrange group associations, thus, violating the First
Amendment. Such redistribution may be racially and politically motivated.").
104 Professor Ellickson observes:
While no one's will is fully free, virtually all of us have some capacity for self-control. Le-
gal and ethical systems therefore properly subscribe to the proposition-or salutary
myth-that an individual is generally responsible for his behavior. This policy, at the
margin, helps foster civic rectitude.
To treat the destitute as choiceless underestimates their capacities and, by failing to
regard them as ordinary people, risks denying them full humanity.
Ellickson, supra note 15, at 1187.
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ted crimes. 105 But the last several years have witnessed a move to a
more proactive model of policing, one that seeks to concentrate re-
sources on problem areas and problem people. Some of these
changes, such as community-based policing, more random drug
testing,07 metal detectors in schools, and sobriety checkpoints,c-1 can
affect a large percentage of the community. Other practices, how-
ever, have a more focused impact...
The most obvious example-and the most pernicious from a race
standpoint-is the practice of pretextual stops. Complaints about ra-
cial profiling and stopping people for "driving (or walking) while
black"10 have been muffled by the Supreme Court's decision in Whren
v. United States."' In Whren, the Court ruled that as long as there is an
objectively reasonable basis for the police to stop a person, no inquiry
into the actual reason for the stop is required. Given the high num-
ber of traffic laws, the relatively light burden required for Teny stops,
and the Court's generous interpretation about what constitutes con-
sent to search, it would be a particularly dense police officer who
could not find some reason to briefly detain a person she had previ-
ously selected even if the reason for the stop is in fact race-based." 2
While we may have little sympathy for the person who turns out to be
105 For a brief but interesting history of the evolution of police discretion-hom the goal in
the early and middle part of the twentieth century uas to achieve "reactive law enforcement"
rather than proactive crime prevention--see Kelling, supra note 25, at 5-7.
106 For an analysis of the evolution of policing theories, see Livingston, supra note 17. at 565-
78. For a discussion of how "community based policing" does not necessarily translate into a
less intrusive or even a more citizen-friendly law enforcement model, see Kelling. supra note 25.
at 10. See also Roberts, supra note 26, at 775-76 ("[P]olicies that delegate to the police greater
authority to maintain order are sometimes confused ith a related innovation called commu-
nity policing .... Although [the two] sometimes overlap... [olrder maintenance policing
policies do not necessarily involve communities in either their design or their implementa-
tion.").
107 SeeVernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (drug testing of school ath-
letes); see also Nat Hentoff, Don't Wdfare Reipients Hate Rights?. WASH. Posr, Jan. 8. 2000. at A 19
(describing the implementation of 1996 federal welfitre reform law that allows states to ran-
domly drug test welfare recipients).
la, See, e-g., Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990); see also Edmond v.
Goldsmith, 183 F.3d 659 (7th Cir. 1999), art. granted sub. nom, City of Indianapolis v. Edmond.
120 S.Ct. 1156 (2000).
109 See Kelling, supra note 25, at 9 (discussing how shift in police practice to more "preventive
interventionist model" can "take[] police to the edge, or even over the edge. of constitutional
law-at least as it has been interpreted for the last 30 years').
110 For a discussion of this topic, see David A. Harris. "hiing Wide Btlatk'and All Other Traffic
Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops. 87J. Ci.%t. L & CRUMtNoLoGV 544 (1997);
Tracey Maclin, "Black and Blue Encounters'-Sone Preliminar" Thoughts About Fourth Arendment
Seizures. Should Race Matter?, 26 VAL U. L REV. 243, 250-62 (1991); Anthony C. Thompson.
Stoning the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 N.YU. L RE,. 956 (1999).
517 U.S. 806 (1996). For commentary on lWirn, see Diana Roberto Donohoe, 'Could
Have," "Mould Have": Iquzt the Supreme Court Should Hatte Dtidd in Whren v. United States, 34
AM. CRIM. L REv. 1193 (1997); David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minonty Motorsts, and the Future
of theFourth Amendment, 1997 SuP. CT. REV. 271 (1997).
1 This argument was specifically raised and rejected in llirtn. SeeReply Brief for Petitioners
at 17-19, Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (No. 95-5841).
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breaking the law, an officer's ability to select targets for intervention
at will presents two distinct problems. To the extent that selection
process is unrestrained, the likelihood of stopping an innocent per-
son is very high, since the legal cost to the officer of a false stop is
negligible. Second, those in the targeted group inevitably will be
over-represented in the arrest and conviction statistics, which in turn
helps justify treating certain groups as if they were more crime prone
than others. A law enforcement policy intent on dislocating citizens
based on their characteristics rather than on behavior would thus
have an easier time doing so.'
A second aggressive technique is the use of sting operations. Al-
though the government may not create crimes to trap the innocent,
the case law allows them to go a long way in this direction."' Police
need not, for example, have probable cause to believe that a person is
about to commit a crime before affording the opportunity to do so."'
And for certain low level crimes-theft, possession of stolen goods,
drug possession-it is extremely hard for certain defendants to show
lack of predisposition."6 Although some residual constraints remain
on the ability to target certain suspects, 7 there is little doubt that
there are broad opportunities for singling out disfavored people for
a rre st.] lS
A third technique, one of long standing, is the choice of enforce-
113 Cf Roberts, supra note 26, at 783 ("Loitering laws inevitably involve judgments about peo-
ple's criminal propensity. They embody legislative predictions about the likelihood that people
engaged in certain activities, bearing certain characteristics, or belonging to certain groups will
engage in criminal activity.").
See, e.g., United States v. Simpson, 813 F.2d 1462, 1466-68 (9th Cir. 1987) (admitting evi-
dence from a paid F.B.I. informant who became romantically involved with the defendant).
1 SeeJacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 549-50 (1992) (noting that the government's
mere affording the opportunity to commit a crime will not defeat prosecution).
16 See generally Ian J. McLoughlin, Note, The Meaning of Predisposition in Practice, 79 B.U. L.
RE%,. 1067 (1999) (arguing that many defendants cannot show lack of predisposition).
11 See, e.g., Paul Marcus, The Due Process Defense in Entrapment Cases: TheJourney Back, 27 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 457, 460 n.24 (1990) (citing cases where courts have noted the validity of a due
process claim).
11 There have been claims, for example, that African-American public officials are dispro-
portionately targeted for criminal investigation. In a 1992 article recounting the frequency of
such charges, the ABAJournal offered the following information:
A 1990 study by the National Council of Churches shows that more than 14 percent of
the public corruption cases over the past five years targeted black officials, who make up
less than two percent of the country's elected officials. In the South, where three per-
cent of all elected officials are black, the study found that 40 percent of public corrup-
tion cases were pursued against blacks.
Though less than one-half of one percent of the federal judiciary is black, three of the
five U.S. District Courtjudges indicted in the past decade were Black.
Mark Curriden, Selective Prosecution: Are Black Officials Investigative Targets?, A.B.A.J., Feb. 1992,
at 54, 55. Even the president of the National District Attorney's Association admitted that
"while I do not believe that blacks are being selectively prosecuted, I certainly can understand
how such a theory is gaining popularity." Id. For additional discussion and citations on this
point, see Andrew D. Leipold, Objective Tests and Subjective Bias: Some Problems of Discriminatoiy
Intent in the CriminalLaw, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 559, 573-78 (1998).
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ment priorities. At a general level it is impermissible to bring charges
against a person because of an improper consideration such as
race.119  But as every defense lawyer knows, selective prosecution
claims are hard to prove, since they require clear proof of discrimina-
tory intent, not just discriminatory effecL3 Prosecutors may legiti-
mately concentrate their enforcement efforts against particular
groups (such as street gangs) without running afoul of the Constitu-
tion, as long as the decision is based on the group's conduct and not
its demographics. 2 ' As sensible as this rule is, it carries with it a dan-
ger that if prosecutors have the authority to extend to police the dis-
persal power-perhaps as part of a negotiated guilty plea-it could
have a notable adverse effect on minority-race citizens.
In short, there are risks to the proposal, some obvious, some less
so. The last section offers some thoughts on whether the costs out-
weigh the benefits.
CONCLUSION
If the overriding goal is to minimize the opportunities for invidi-
ous law enforcement efforts, Morales is plainly a step in the right di-
rection. Giving the police broad powers to enforce low-level crimes is
inconsistent with a due process vision of criminal justice, and perhaps
courts should continue to strike down an), statute that sounds in the
Papachristou, Coates, Lawson, and now Morales tradition. Although the
burdens of this greater freedom will fall more heavily on those who
live in dangerous neighborhoods, so too do some of the benefits, as
the risks of police zealousness are kept in greater check.
The strand of individual liberty running through this view-that
some risk is the price of an open society' -is very appealing. It also
is true that there is no clean divide between the impact of more rig-
orous law enforcement on "gang members" and "law abiding citi-
zens." Aggressive police practices often inflict harm on the whole
119 See; eg., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598. 608 (1985).
1- See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 458 (1996) (defendant must show that the
government declined to prosecute similarly situated suspects of other races). For a useful
analysis of Armstrong, see Richard H. McAdams, Race and Selrd, Prosculzon: Diczmnrmg the
Pitfalls of Armstrong 73 CHI.-KENrr L REV. 605 (1998). See also Anthony V. Alfieri. Prosecuang
Race, 48 DUKE LJ. 1157 (1999).
1 See; ag., People v. Mantel, 388 N.Y.S.2d 565. 569 (1976) ("Any area of activit) that carries
with it a high incidence of crime is an appropriate choice for strenuous law enforcement.').
1 Although prosecutors' discretion to recommend certain dispositions following a guilty
plea is often constrained by sentencing guidelines, they retain a great deal of discretion in craft-
ing the indictment or information in wiays that make certain sentences more likely. Cf. FED. R.
GMI. P. 11 (e) (1) (recognizing prosecutor's authority to dismiss certain charges. make sentenc-
ing recommendations, or agree to specific sentences in return for guilty plea).
Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 cmL g (1979) ("It is an obvious truth that
each individual in a community must put up with a certain amount of annoyance, inconven-
ience and interference and must take a certain amount of risk in order that all may get on to-
gether.").
Feb. 20011
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
community, even when the net result is less crime.121
Ultimately, however, the argument that there should be no re-
strictions on aggressive loitering is unsatisfying; the legitimate con-
cerns of the law-abiding members of the community are simply too
compelling to ignore. Justice Frankfurter correctly observed that
"[w]ise accommodation between liberty and order always has been,
and ever will be, indispensable for a democratic society, " 2' and yet
the helplessness and anger caused by street-level lawlessness have
been felt too sharply by too many to assume that the current situation
strikes an appropriate equilibrium between freedom and security.12
It is important to remember that a large majority of citizens (over
seventy percent) of every race, both genders, and almost all ages, be-
lieve that courts are not tough enough on criminals1 27 and that, de-
spite the recent drop in the crime rate, more than forty percent of
citizens continue to feel afraid when walking in their own neighbor-
hoods after dark. 28  The fears of those who feel trapped in their
homes are genuine and legitimate, and our desire to limit the reach
of the criminal law should not lead us to forget the interests of those
who pay a disproportionate price for the increased freedom that
cases like Morales extend.
So if change is to be made, it is best done in measured steps. A
targeted loitering proposal such as the one offered here will not solve
all the problems, but it should lead to some improvement, despite
the risks. By limiting police discretion over loiterers to those who
have passed before a judicial eye; by targeting those who are actual
wrongdoers rather than just those who associate with wrongdoers;
and by depriving gangs of key members in a relatively unobtrusive
manner that avoids incarceration, the proposal may help divide those
most affected by street sweeping laws along behavioral rather than ra-
cial or class lines. Those who break the law deserve no better, but
those who live within the laws do deserve better than the status quo.
124 Professor Roberts makes the point this way: "[the Chicago gang-loitering ordinance in
particular entrenches the racialized division of Americans into the presumptively lawless whose
liberties deserve little protection and the presumptively law-abiding who are entitled to rule
over them." Roberts, supra note 26, at 779-80. For a recent example of this problem, see David
Barstow, Antidrug Tactics Exact Price on a Neighborhood, Many Say, N.Y. TiMES, Apr. 1, 2000, at Al.
12 Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
126 At a minimum, the political pressure to take action against street-level disorder continues
at a high level, despite years of falling crime rates. See Kelling, supra note 25, at 9 ("Increasingly,
police are under renewed and constant pressure from neighborhood groups and city halls
across the country-not to mention State legislatures and the U.S. Congress--to "do something
now" about eliminating the excesses of the drug market, getting guns off the street, and regain-
inq control over public places." (footnote omitted)).
See SOURCEBOOK 1998, supra note 19, at 128-29 tbl.2.50.
128 ld. at 118-19 tbl.2.38. The survey cited divided people into two demographic groups:
"white" and "black/other." Among the former group, forty percent said they were apprehen-
sive about walking alone at night within a mile of their home. Among the latter group, forty-
seven percent said they were apprehensive. Id.
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